

# Shultz's Memoirs Portray a

By Lou Cannon  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former president Ronald Reagan is depicted in the memoirs of his secretary of state, George P. Shultz, as a visionary and stubborn chief executive who often rose above incompetent and uncompromising advisers, but also distorted facts and at times "almost knowingly" deceived himself.

This complex portrait of Reagan, who is pictured as being more engaged in decision-making than was generally recognized, emerges from Shultz's new book, "Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State," published today.

In the highly detailed, 1,184-page memoirs, Shultz maintains that his efforts to build a relationship with Reagan and a coherent foreign policy were repeatedly undermined by the opposition of conservative advisers in the White House, Central Intelligence Agency Director William P. Casey and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger. Shultz writes that on several occasions he was on the verge of resignation, only to be talked out of it by Reagan.

While Shultz sharply criticizes Reagan's performance in the Iran-contra affair, he also depicts a president who defied his administration's conservative wing to negotiate with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and who changed and grew during his presidency.

"Sometimes President Reagan simply did not care that much about

facts and details," Shultz says in assessing Reagan. "That bothered the press and it bothered me."

When he told me how the release of the Russian Pentecostals [from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow] was linked to his subsequent lifting of the grain embargo against the Soviets imposed by Jimmy Carter, I pointed out that he had lifted that embargo shortly after taking office, over two years before the Soviets allowed the Pentecostals to emigrate. He nodded in agreement and kept right on telling the same story. More importantly, no matter how often I pointed out to him that he had indeed traded arms for hostages in the Iran-contra affair, he found that impossible to accept."

But Shultz says Reagan used his gift for storytelling to impart a larger message more important to him than facts. Reagan, writes Shultz, was a dreamer with a "bedrock of principle and purpose," who was determined to convert the military buildup over which he had presided into concrete agreements with the Soviet Union that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The great foreign policy achievement of the Reagan administration, Shultz maintains, was to bring about "a turning point" in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Shultz said in an interview yesterday that President George Bush was slow to appreciate the opportunities created by this turning point because he wanted his administration perceived as "Bush One instead of Reagan Three."

"This is understandable, but he overdid it," Shultz said.

Because of Bush's desire to start

over and the skepticism of Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, about U.S.-Soviet arms reduction treaties, his administration moved far too slowly in negotiating a U.S.-Soviet treaty to slash strategic nuclear arsenals. Shultz said. Thousands of these missiles remain deployed today in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Shultz also faulted Bush for misrepresenting his position on the secret deal authorized by Reagan to swap U.S. arms to Iran for American hostages held in Lebanon.

Bush has long maintained that he was "out of the loop" on these negotiations. But Shultz's book relates that the vice president sat silently in meetings during discussions of the arms sales, which were opposed by Shultz and Weinberger.

On Nov. 9, 1986, soon after revelation of the arms sales, Shultz writes, Bush "admonished" him over drinks for opposing the initiative, "asking emphatically whether I realized there are major strategic objectives being pursued in Iran." Shultz says he reminded Bush that the vice president had not objected to the arms-for-hostages swap, and they then parted with "considerable tension."

But Shultz goes beyond asserting that Bush was fully informed. He also contends that Bush, along with Casey and White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, attempted to keep the initiative alive even after it had been disclosed.

Reagan "buffaloed himself" on the Iran initiative from beginning to end because he was determined to free the Americans held captive in Lebanon, Shultz says. After Reagan

# Visionary but Self-Deceptive Reagan



**GEORGE P. SHULTZ**  
... faults Reagan's conservative aides

stated inaccurately in a nationally televised speech on Nov. 13, 1986, that he had not traded arms for hostages, Shultz says, it became impossible to convince him that this was untrue.

"I had seen this happen before on other issues," Shultz writes. "He would go over the 'script' of an event, past or present, in his mind and once that script was mastered that was the truth—no fact, no argument, no plea for reconsideration could change his mind. So what Reagan said to the American people was true to him, although it was not the reality."

There appears to be at least one contradiction between Shultz's account of Iran-contra events in the book and the account he gave during a congressional investigation of

the affair. In the book he writes that arguments against the initiative made by him and Weinberger at a Dec. 7, 1985, meeting at the White House "had won the day." During his testimony Shultz said that he thought Reagan was "somewhat on the fence" at the meeting.

Shultz replaced Alexander M. Haig Jr. as secretary of state on June 25, 1982, and held office until the end of the Reagan presidency on Jan. 20, 1989. During these 6½ years he was often at odds with Weinberger, Casey, William P. Clark and other conservative pillars of the administration.

In "Turmoil and Triumph," Shultz hits back at his adversaries, describing them scathingly as uninformed and deceptive.

Clark is "blundering Bill Clark" who fails to grasp substance, becomes "panicky" when challenged and tries to deny Shultz access to the president because he fears that Reagan is too willing to negotiate with the Soviets.

Weinberger, a Shultz ally on Iran-contra and little else, is scorned for unwillingness to use military force except under the most limited and favorable circumstances. Shultz describes Weinberger's six-point doctrine for using U.S. troops only as a last resort and when there is clear-cut congressional and popular support as "the Vietnam syndrome in spades, carried to an absurd level, and a complete abdication of the duties of leadership."

Casey is accused of pursuing his own agenda and of trying to undermine efforts to negotiate conflicts in Central America. Shultz relates a conversation in which Casey said to

him during negotiations with Nicaragua, "Don't be a pilgrim, George." When Shultz asked him what that meant, Casey replied, "An early settler."

The Shultz memoirs add new details about the unsuccessful effort of the Reagan administration to negotiate the peaceful departure from power of Panamanian leader Manuel Antonio Noriega. He was not deposed until the United States invaded Panama at President Bush's order in December 1989.

Shultz relates that in May 1988 he backed Reagan when the president stood up to Bush, Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III, White House Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker Jr. and his deputy Ken Duberstein in favoring a settlement that would have encouraged Noriega to leave Panama without a war.

"I'm not giving in," Shultz quotes Reagan as saying. "This deal is better than going in and counting our dead. I just think you are wrong as hell on this." The proposed settlement was rejected by Noriega.

Shultz also gives new details of the October 1986 summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, when Reagan and Gorbachev were on the brink of negotiating an agreement to eliminate all U.S.-Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles within 10 years. The deal broke up over Gorbachev's insistence that Reagan confine his proposed missile defense system, the Strategic Defense Initiative, to "laboratory" research.

Reagan turned this down, then passed a note to Shultz that said, "Am I wrong?" Shultz whispered to him, "No, you are right."